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A COMMENT ON PRIVATIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
JOHN N. DROBAK* 
Modern western societies have both a functioning market system and 
democratic political institutions.  The relationship between these two aspects of 
society prompted Professor Rose’s article, Privatization—The Road to 
Democracy?.1  Although her title identifies “privatization” as her subject, the 
article is much more ambitious.  It really considers the market itself and the 
relationship between the market and democratization.  Professor Rose says that 
privatization and democratization are siblings,2 but I would say that the market 
system and the political system are the siblings.  In fact, they are Siamese 
twins, because you cannot have an economic system without a political system. 
The libertarian longing for a laissez faire economy, free of government 
intrusion, is fascination with a fantasy.3  Even a simple economy cannot exist 
without rules that define and protect property rights and exchange.4  A modern 
market system—with impersonal non-simultaneous exchange, complex multi-
party transactions, and esoteric financing methods, to name just a few 
attributes—requires significant government involvement.  The debate, really, is 
over the degree of government interaction in economic matters, not over 
whether the government should be involved. 
The market and political systems are related in another way that can lead to 
serious economic problems.  Economic growth depends on competition in 
economic markets, which encourages efficiency, innovation, better products, 
and entrepreneurial skills.  If the market works so that resources flow into their 
highest use, the breadbasket of goods and services grows to its fullest.  
Monopolies prevent this from happening, however, and the natural tendency of 
people is to try to dominate markets.  Furthermore, people try to use the 
government to obtain and defend their monopoly power.  Power in political 
markets is used to obtain power in economic markets.  Political power can 
 
* George Alexander Madill Professor of Law, Professor of Economics, and Director of the Center 
for Interdisciplinary Studies, Washington University in Saint Louis. 
 1. See Carol M. Rose, Privatization—The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691 
(2006). 
 2. Id. at 694. 
 3. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 122 
(2005). 
 4. See id. 
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come from various things: affinity with government officials (from 
relationships of kinship, friendship, tribal identity, religious affiliation, etc.) or 
corruption, to name two examples.  These can close off competition in political 
markets and then in economic ones.  One of the reasons that the rule of law is 
so important is its protection of competition in both economic and political 
markets.  With a regime of laws, not people, with transparent and predictable 
rules, everyone has the opportunity to compete on a level playing field (putting 
aside wealth disparities). 
Some of the complaints against privatization noted by Professor Rose are 
really complaints against a market system—a market system that causes great 
disparities in wealth and sometimes richly rewards lucky people who are not 
investors or entrepreneurs but are only in the right place at the right time.5  The 
choice, however, is only between a market system and a command and control 
economy.  The collapse of the Soviet Union showed what is bound to happen 
to a command and control economy.  Those types of economies are bound to 
fail over time from the weight of the transaction costs required to run the 
system and also from the absence of the signaling system that is provided by 
the intersection of supply and demand.6  The magic of a market system comes 
from its inherent signaling mechanism.  By purchasing goods and services—by 
“voting with their dollars”—consumers disclose their preferences about what 
they want to buy and, hence, to have produced.  With this information, 
producers invest in and produce more of the goods and services desired by 
consumers.7  This creates an efficient way to allocate resources and leads to a 
bigger breadbasket of goods and services.8 
In a command and control economy, the government decides by fiat what 
to produce.  It requires economic plans, like the Soviet Union’s regular five-
year plans, and complex input and output production matrixes.9  As an 
economy grows, this process takes so much time and consumes so many 
resources that it can undermine the economy; this happened in the Soviet 
Union.10  Furthermore, without the signaling mechanism of a market system, a 
command and control economy results in shortages of some goods and services 
in high demand and surpluses of undesired products.  It is much more difficult 
 
 5. See Rose, supra note 1, at 707–710. 
 6. Douglass C. North, Cognitive Science and the Study of the “Rules of the Game” in a 
World of Uncertainty, in NORMS AND THE LAW (John N. Drobak ed., forthcoming 2006). 
 7. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 44 & n.13 (1988). 
 8. See id. at 44. 
 9. See NORTH, supra note 3, at 147. 
 10. Id. at 154.  Party-dominated industries are also inefficient because party goals lead to the 
promotion of poor managers and the creation of inefficient incentives for workers.  See generally 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 59–62 (Lee J. Alston, Thrainn Eggertsson & 
Douglass C. North eds., 1996); Jan Winiecki, Why Economic Reforms Fail in the Soviet System—
A Property Rights-Based Approach, 28 ECON. INQUIRY 195 (1990). 
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to sustain a command and control economy today than it was fifty years ago.  
If a country wants to participate in today’s global economy, it is compelled to 
adopt many aspects of a market system.  Otherwise it could not compete in the 
world market and attract investment from outside the country.  China’s 
economic liberalization is a good illustration of this.11 
Neoclassical price theory, the predominant model of economics, assumes 
away wealth effects and disregards distributive consequences.12  The theory 
assumes all consumers have enough resources to participate in the economy—
have enough wealth to register their “votes” for their preferred goods and 
services.  There are probably millions of people in the market economies of the 
world too poor to participate in the market.  Even worse, many of these people 
live in poverty and lack basic necessities of life, like stable jobs and health 
care.  Many of these ills of a market system can be tempered by social 
programs that provide a true safety net for those too poor to participate in the 
market.  This requires, however, the courage to raise taxes and to tolerate the 
inefficiencies—and the waste—that are bound to be part of anything as large 
as a government bureaucracy.  The market economies of the world provide for 
their poor in different ways and to different degrees.  Both the “third way” of 
the Scandinavian countries and the social democracies of Europe are still 
market economies allocating resources through the signaling mechanism of 
supply and demand.13  Like it or not, a market system is the only feasible way 
to organize a modern economy today. 
A market system could not exist without private property, which makes 
privatization so important.  Privatization is a way to create private property out 
of government-owned property.  A market system also depends on a 
framework of laws and norms that create incentives for economically 
productive activities.14  This is where the set of laws Professor Rose labels as 
 
 11. See generally RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 
(2002); MURRAY WEIDENBAUM & SAMUEL HUGHES, THE BAMBOO NETWORK: HOW 
EXPATRIATE CHINESE ENTREPRENEURS ARE CREATING A NEW ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER IN 
ASIA (1996); Karen Halverson, China’s WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political 
Implications, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 319 (2004). 
 12. See generally Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 
1, 32 (2005) (“Neoclassical price theory holds that in perfect competition, firms price at marginal 
cost, which leads to optimal deployment of social resources.”). 
 13. See Roger Cohen, Redrawing the Free Market; Amid a Global Financial Crisis, Calls 
for Regulation Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1998, at B9 (the term “third way” has been applied 
during the twentieth century to German social democracy and attempted economic reforms in the 
Soviet Union); William E. Schmidt, In a Post-Cold War Era, Scandinavia Rethinks Itself, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1992, at 4-3 (stating that Social Democrats in Sweden refer to the “third way” as 
their neutrality between Europe’s East and West). 
 14. See Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737, 1739–40 (2002); 
John N. Drobak, Law Matters, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 97, 97–99 (1998). 
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“recognition,” “deregulation,” and “enablement” come into play.15  By 
lowering the costs of transacting in the market and by creating productive 
incentives, these types of laws can advance economic growth.  For example, 
economic transactions can occur even with informal title, but the lack of 
formal legal title can create uncertainty and increase risk.  Laws that create 
formal title in squatters, a form of “recognition,” make economic transactions 
less costly and less risky, and hence more likely.  These kinds of laws can help 
make unproductive land productive and help the poor get a better life.16 
Laws that provide for “recognition,” “deregulation,” and “enablement” do 
not necessarily increase economic growth, however.  They can be 
counterproductive in some circumstances.  For example, laws that give legal 
title to squatters destroy existing property rights and effectively take property 
from its owner and transfer it to someone else, without any compensation to 
the owner.  Laws recognizing squatters’ rights make property ownership more 
risky; this can inhibit investment and limit transactions involving property 
subject to squatting.  We may applaud when poor peasants in the Amazon 
become productive when they take over undeveloped parts of large plantations, 
even if they take part in the destruction of the rain forest.17  We may be less 
enthusiastic when the government of Zimbabwe evicts white ranch owners and 
their long-time black ranch hands in order to give the ranches to political 
supporters of the president.18 
Laws concerning “recognition,” “deregulation,” and “enablement” do not 
deal with privatization, although they have important economic consequences.  
It is the set of policies that Professor Rose labels as “divesture”19 that most 
people would consider to be privatization, i.e., transferring government-owned 
property into private hands.20  In considering the economic aspects of 
privatization, it is important to consider two separate questions: (1) What 
theories justify government versus private ownership? and (2) Why do 
countries choose to divest themselves of the ownership of companies and of 
entire industries? 
 
 15. See Rose, supra note 1, at 694–98. 
 16. See Bernadette Atuahene, Land Titling: A Mode of Privatization with the Potential to 
Deepen Democracy, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 761, 762 (2006). 
 17. See Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap & Bernardo Mueller, Property Rights and Land 
Conflict: A Comparison of Settlement of the U.S. Western and Brazilian Amazon Frontiers, in 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE WORLD ECONOMY SINCE 1800, at 55, 66–67 (John H. Coatsworth & 
Alan M. Taylor eds., 1998); Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap & Robert Schneider, Property Rights 
and the Preconditions for Markets: The Case of the Amazon Frontier, 151 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 89, 89–91 (1995). 
 18. See MARTIN MEREDITH, OUR VOTES, OUR GUNS: ROBERT MUGABE AND THE TRAGEDY 
OF ZIMBABWE 124–27 (2002). 
 19. See Rose, supra note 1, at 696–97. 
 20. Id. 
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I.  THEORIES OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 
Although it does not justify government ownership per se, the economic 
theory of natural monopoly justifies the use of only one firm to meet the entire 
demand of a market.  Natural monopolies result in industries with marginal or 
incremental costs continually decreasing with increasing sales.21  These cost 
characteristics mean that prices can decrease with increasing sales as well, so 
customers are better off as more and more of the good is sold.  The monopoly 
is “natural” because even with competing firms, only one firm will survive, 
namely the firm with the greatest sales and hence lowest price.22  These 
industries are typically those with high fixed costs, such as railroads, airports, 
and distribution companies, like water, electricity, and natural gas.  The cost to 
begin business is extremely high, while the cost to supply each successive unit 
is smaller and smaller.  High-tech industries with large research and 
development expenditures and low production costs, such as software and 
pharmaceutical companies, also exhibit natural monopoly characteristics.  That 
is one of the reasons that the market for a software applications program, such 
as for word-processing or for spreadsheets, may be dominated by one 
particular program until it is replaced by another, in a succession of mini-
monopolies.23 
If it makes sense economically for only one firm to supply the entire 
market, a question remains as to whether the firm should be owned by 
investors or by the government, i.e., whether the firm should be private or 
public.  A private firm in a natural monopoly market will charge a monopoly 
price unless restrained by the government, hence the history of price-setting 
commissions at the federal and state levels.24  Commissions alone, however, 
are not enough.  Regulation requires educated bureaucrats who understand 
engineering, accounting, and finance.  In examining the desirability of 
privatizing telecommunications in various countries, two World Bank 
economists emphasized that privatization required a qualified and expert 
bureaucracy that was beyond the capability of some countries.25  If the 
government is to provide a natural monopoly good or service rather than a 
private firm, however, the bureaucrats still must perform some of the tasks of a 
ratemaking commission when they set prices.  They must determine costs, 
including the cost of capital, and deal with such ratemaking functions as 
 
 21. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 318 (2d ed. 2001). 
 22. Id. at 318–19. 
 23. See W. Brian Arthur, Increasing Returns and the New World of Business, HARV. BUS. 
REV., July–Aug. 1996, at 100, 102–03. 
 24. See, e.g., LOUIS B. SCHWARTZ, JOHN J. FLYNN & HARRY FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: GOVERNMENT REGULATION 316–17 (6th ed. 1985). 
 25. Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory 
Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, 10 J.L. ECON & ORG. 
201, 240–242 (1994). 
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allocating costs between various customer classes, such as residential, 
commercial, and industrial.  Since the process of a government utility setting 
its own rates does not entail an adversarial hearing and procedural safeguards, 
as with a proceeding before a public utility commission, it is probably much 
less expensive than setting rates for an investor-owned utility. 
Economists usually prefer regulated private firms over government 
ownership because they believe private firms will be operated more 
efficiently.26  To the extent that politicians hand out jobs with government 
utilities for patronage, the risk of inefficiency is high.  However, the vast 
majority of government utilities have been operated professionally in the 
United States.  Just compare the public entities that provide water, irrigation, 
and electricity across the country with the investor-owned utilities.  In fact, 
studies of the efficiency of electric utilities in the United States have found no 
significant differences between public and private ownership.27  That makes 
sense because the people who work in either type of utility respond the same 
way to supervision, salaries, and motivation.  Plus, a private firm with a 
monopoly lacks the spur to efficiency that comes from competition; rather, its 
incentives come from regulatory oversight. 
 
 26. One economist explains the preference for private firms as follows: 
The key issue is how the ownership of the firm affects the costs of production.  Private 
owners have an incentive to minimize costs as long as they reap part of the benefit in the 
form of higher profit.  If the firm’s managers are doing a bad job of keeping costs down, 
the firm’s owners will fire them.  By contrast, if the government bureaucrats who run a 
monopoly do a bad job, the losers are the customers and taxpayers, whose only recourse is 
the political system.  The bureaucrats may become a special-interest group and attempt to 
block cost-reducing reforms.  Put simply, as a way of ensuring that firms are well run, the 
voting booth is less reliable than the profit motive. 
MANKIW, supra note 21, at 333.  This is, of course, only a theory and a generalization of how the 
world works.  It probably is impossible to know empirically how accurately it describes the 
efficiency of private and government-owned firms operating in natural monopoly markets.  In 
addition, regulated utilities do not have the same profit motive as firms in a competitive market. 
 27. See Paul M. Hayashi, Melanie Sevier & John M. Trapani, An Analysis of Pricing and 
Production Efficiency of Electric Utilities by Mode of Ownership, in REGULATING UTILITIES IN 
AN ERA OF DEREGULATION 111, 112 (Michael A. Crew ed., 1987); Scott E. Atkinson & Robert 
Halvorsen, The Relative Efficiency of Public and Private Firms in a Regulated Environment: The 
Case of U.S. Electric Utilities, 29 J. PUB. ECON. 281, 293 (1986); Robert A. Meyer, Publicly 
Owned Versus Privately Owned Utilities: A Policy Choice, 57 REV. ECON. & STAT. 391, 398 
(1975).  Contra Donn R. Pescatrice & John M. Trapani III, The Performance and Objectives of 
Public and Private Utilities Operating in the United States, 13 J. PUB. ECON. 259, 259–60, 274–
75 (1980).  For studies of the efficiency of utilities in other countries, see MICHAEL G. POLLITT, 
OWNERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE IN ELECTRIC UTILITIES: THE INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON 
PRIVATIZATION AND EFFICIENCY 21–22 (1995); Johan Willner, Ownership, Efficiency, and 
Political Interference, 17 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 723 (2001).  Rates are lower for government-owned 
utilities because, as government entities, they pay no federal income tax.  The income taxes paid 
by private utilities are passed on to the customers as part of the rates.  See SCHWARTZ, FLYNN & 
FIRST, supra note 24, at 566–67. 
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For industries that are natural monopolies, in which only one firm should 
serve the market, a comparison of the relative costs of setting prices and the 
relative efficiency of operating the firm does not point to a clear preference for 
a public or private firm.  Countries and governments throughout the world 
have made different choices for the same type of industries.  For example, 
there is a patchwork of municipal and private water companies throughout the 
United States.28  As Professor Rose points out, sometimes a government shifts 
back and forth between public and private, as New York City has done with its 
water supply.29  Professor Rose also points out that this choice may stem from 
a perception that private firms can more readily raise capital and charge 
customers for plant improvements, free from interference by unhappy voters 
who dislike rate increases.30  I suspect that ideological preference for 
government over investor-owned firms, or vice versa, has played a role in the 
choices made by governments over the years and throughout the world.  I also 
believe that many people have viewed the products and services of these 
natural monopoly firms (e.g., water, electricity, and natural gas) to be a too-
important part of the infrastructure to be trusted to the market.  In today’s 
terminology, the concern would be a fear of outsourcing some parts of the 
business of government. 
The theory of public goods also justifies government providing goods and 
services.  Public goods are those automatically provided to the entire 
community when they are provided at all.  In economic terms, public goods are 
“nonexcludable” because no one can be excluded from enjoying the good, 
which leads to free-riding by people who will use the good without paying.31  
Military defense, flood control, and clean air are common examples.32  Roads 
are another example, because it is impracticable (in terms of both time and 
money) to charge every user for traveling on every road.33  The government 
can use taxes to force free riders to pay, while a private firm could not prevent 
free riding by any type of pricing method.34 
 
 28. Craig Anthony Arnold, Privatization of Public Water Services: The States’ Role in 
Ensuring Public Accountability, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 561, 562 (2005) (“Although the portion of all 
public water services in the United States provided by privately-owned water suppliers is small 
(about eleven to fifteen percent), this portion has increased dramatically over the past two 
decades . . . .”). 
 29. Rose, supra note 1, at 708. 
 30. Id. 
 31. MANKIW, supra note 21, at 226–31.  Public goods are not only nonexcludable, they are 
also “non-rival,” meaning that one person’s use of the good does not deplete the good or diminish 
another person’s use of the good.  Id. at 226.  If some people’s use of clean air made the air dirty 
for others, it would not be a public good.  See id. 
 32. See id. at 226–30. 
 33. See id. at 227. 
 34. See id. at 228. 
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In addition to supplying natural monopoly products and public goods, 
governments commonly provide goods and services that will not be provided 
by the market.35  This would be the case for people too poor to buy essential 
goods and services at market prices.  Public housing for the poor, provided by 
countries throughout the world, is the most common example.36  It is true that 
the market can be used to supply housing to the poorest people through the use 
of government subsidies.  However, it may be less expensive to provide 
government housing than to operate a subsidy system, and more politically 
acceptable to avoid allowing landlords to get richer under the subsidy 
scheme.37  A second class of products that is not adequately supplied by the 
market are those products with social benefits exceeding the aggregate of the 
private benefit to their current users.  Consider the national park system, for 
example.  If the provision of parks were left to the market, there would be an 
under-supply because the revenues paid by the users would not reflect the 
benefits to future users, including unborn generations who cannot pay to 
preserve the park for their use in the future and living potential users who 
would attempt to free ride.  In addition, it is impractical to charge people for 
the benefit they get just from knowing that there is a Yosemite Park preserved 
for us and for future generations, even if these people have no intention of 
visiting the park.  Passenger railroads and subways probably fall into this 
category, as well.  Many governments subsidize them, reflecting a belief that 
society benefits beyond the aggregate of the private benefit to each passenger. 
The three types of goods described above—natural monopoly goods, 
public goods, and goods with social benefits exceeding aggregate private 
benefits—would not be adequately provided by the market.  Consequently, it 
does no harm to a market system to have the government provide these goods.  
Likewise, it does no harm to supply goods to people too poor to buy them in 
the market.  In addition, these goods make up such a small percentage of the 
economy that a market system would still exist even if the government chose 
to provide all of them.  Economic competition would still be possible, so 
government participation in these parts of the economy would not hinder 
 
 35. See id. at 229–30. 
 36. See MANKIW, supra note 21, at 229. 
 37. In explaining why the government still supported rent control while it was moving the 
rest of the economy to a market system, Vaclav Klaus, who was then the prime minister of the 
Czech Republic, said that higher rents would mean that 
the state would have to pay large sums of money as social help to those in need.  And the 
state support that would be granted to the tenants would in fact be a hidden form of 
indirect support of the houses’ owners.  Then, it would be more rational to channel the 
money from the state budget (if there are any) directly to those areas where the state of 
houses is really critical. 
Vaclav Klaus, Why Do We Still Control Rents?, LIDOVE NOVINY, Apr. 27, 1994 (on file with the 
author). 
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economic growth.  Consequently, economic reasons do not compel 
privatization of these government activities, although a government could 
choose to privatize for other reasons.38 
Governments throughout the world have also owned many different kinds 
of firms that do not fit into the above categories.  Even outside the command 
and control economies of the Communist world, the range of industries owned 
by governments has been broad, including mines, oil companies, steel mills, 
refineries, banks, and airlines.39  Sometimes a belief that these were “strategic” 
industries provided the rationale for government ownership.40  Sometimes 
public ownership was used to provide revenues for the state treasury.41  There 
should be no objection to government ownership of these firms from an 
economic perspective, as long as there is competition.  For example, if there is 
competition in the steel market, government ownership of one steel firm 
should have no ill economic effects.  Competition in the steel market will 
discipline a government-owned steel company that runs inefficiently, serves as 
a haven for patronage workers, or encourages bribes and corruption.  On the 
other hand, if the government monopolizes the steel market, nothing will check 
those abuses, and the government monopoly will harm economic growth.  
Thus, whereas government monopolies of otherwise competitive markets are 
objectionable economically, government ownership per se is not. 
II.  REASONS FOR PRIVATIZATION 
Until the Thatcher privatization in the United Kingdom in the 1980s, most 
governments sold off their industries to raise revenue, often in difficult 
economic times.42  Mexico’s massive asset sales that were begun in response to 
international loan defaults and Egypt’s privatization program that was started 
 
 38. Of course, a government could choose to have less participation in economic affairs by 
authorizing regulated private firms to provide natural monopoly products and by subsidizing 
market supply of the other types of goods. 
 39. See William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of 
Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 321, 323 (2001). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. at 321–23. 
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to correct a deteriorating economy are such examples.43  Ideology played only 
a minor role in these divestitures.44 
Margaret Thatcher, who was a strong advocate of the economic benefits of 
a market system, made it a high priority of her government to dismantle the 
heavy socialist aspect of the United Kingdom by selling most of the state-
owned industries.45  Many of the companies did not fit in any of the three 
categories described above: the North Sea oil and gas companies, British 
Petroleum, British Coal, British Steel, and British Airways.46  Some were 
classic natural monopolies: the national telephone system, the national electric 
company, airports, and British Gas.47  The privatization of the natural 
monopolies not only created private firms, it also created a need for new 
government agencies to supervise the new monopolies and control their 
prices.48  Thatcher’s policies were very successful, reducing the role of state-
owned enterprises from more than ten percent of Britain’s gross domestic 
product in 1980 to essentially nothing when the Conservative Party lost control 
of the government in 1997.49 
The British privatization policies were followed by other European 
countries in the last two decades of the twentieth century, including massive 
divestitures by France and Spain and significant privatizations by Italy and 
Germany.50  In the same period, privatization spread to countries in Asia, 
South America, and Africa.51  Since the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe privatized their command and control 
economies as part of the transition to a market system.52  Privatization was a 
way to create private property and firms, prerequisites to a market system, as 
well as a way to raise revenues to pay for the costs of the transition.  According 
 
 43. Taeko Hoshino, Privatization of Mexico’s Public Enterprises and the Restructuring of 
the Private Sector, 34 DEVELOPING ECON. 34, 40–47 (1996); Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-
de-Silanes, The Benefits of Privatization: Evidence from Mexico (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. W6215, 1997), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=225973; Mohammed Omran, Performance Consequences of Privatizing Egyptian State-
Owned Enterprises: The Effect of Post-privatization Ownership Structure on Firm Performance 
__ (Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working Paper No. 281866, 2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=281866. 
 44. See Megginson & Netter, supra note 39, at 323–24. 
 45. DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE 
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD 
114–15 (1998). 
 46. See generally id. at 119–20. 
 47. See id. at 115–21. 
 48. Id. at 120–21. 
 49. Megginson & Netter, supra note 39, at 324. 
 50. Id at 324–25. 
 51. Id. at 325–26. 
 52. Id. at 326. 
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to two commentators on privatization, most governments have used divestiture 
to achieve six goals: “(1) raise revenue for the state, (2) promote economic 
efficiency, (3) reduce government interference in the economy, (4) promote 
wider share ownership, (5) provide the opportunity to introduce competition, 
and (6) subject [State-Owned Enterprises] to market discipline.”53 
The Czech Republic is a good example of privatization by the transition 
countries, because it used the broadest array of privatization methods with 
relative success.54  Restitution was the process of returning property 
confiscated by the Communist government to the original owners or heirs.55  
All kinds of property were returned under this program, including factories, 
farms, estates, castles, houses, store fronts, apartment buildings, and apartment 
units.  Although the primary purpose of this system was to symbolically atone 
for the government’s wrongs, it also effectively created all kinds of private 
property.56  Small-scale privatization allowed the occupants of stores and small 
businesses, like butcher shops, florists, and restaurants, to purchase the 
facilities if the facilities were not contested under the restitution laws.57  In a 
relatively short period of time, not only did considerable private property come 
into existence, small business owners and merchants became independent of 
the state, strengthening the middle class in the country.  Large-scale 
privatization, the most massive, complex, and time consuming of the types of 
privatization used in the Czech Republic, required selling much of the 
government-owned economy to bidders who tendered offers to the 
government.58  Most of the large enterprises were purchased by other large 
firms, usually foreign.  Volkswagen purchased Skoda Auto, the main Czech 
auto manufacturer;59 Air France purchased Czech Air,60 only to sell it back 
when the merger proved unsuccessful; the international company SABMiller 
purchased the famous Czech brewer Pilsner Urquell;61 and Telefonica, the 
large Spanish telephone company, purchased Czesky Telecom,62 to give some 
 
 53. Id. at 324 (relying on two 1989 studies conducted by Price Waterhouse). 
 54. See Michele Balfour & Cameron Crise, A Privatization Test: The Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Poland, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 84, 93 (1993). 
 55. See id. at 93–94. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. at 93. 
 58. See id. at 94. 
 59. See Alan Cowell, THREATS AND RESPONSES: The New Capitalists; Western Investment 
Provides a Bonanza for East Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2003, at A6. 
 60. See Daily Briefing, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 27, 2000 at 2G (noting that Air France 
and Delta Air Lines were offered a stake in the state-controlled Czech airline). 
 61. Alan Cowell, Big Brewer Withdraws Plan to Offer New Stock, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 
2002, at W1 (stating that SABMiller’s brands include Pilsner Urquell). 
 62. World Business Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at C6 (reporting that the Czech 
government approved the sale of the country’s largest telecommunications company to 
Telefonica). 
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examples.  This process involved some corruption and bribes to government 
officials,63 but nothing on a scale compared to Russia and many of the other 
transition countries.  In the end, it proved to be a way to convert nearly all of 
the large state-owned enterprises into private firms.64 
Shortly after the fall of the Communist government in late 1989, a group of 
government leaders in the then-Czechoslovakia, led by Minister of Finance 
Vaclav Klaus concluded that the transition to a market system would be 
speeded along if all the citizens had a personal stake in the economy.65  They 
devised voucher privatization as a way to make the people shareholders of 
privatized state firms.66  Each citizen was allowed to purchase a booklet of 
vouchers at a nominal price and then exchange the vouchers in an auction for 
shares of stock in new companies created out of some state-owned 
enterprises.67  Thousands of companies of all kinds were privatized this way.68  
The process did not work out as intended, however.  Out of a concern that 
insider information would give some people a real advantage in the process of 
choosing which stock to obtain, the government permitted investment firms to 
participate in the process.69  The hope was that the firms would have an 
incentive to obtain and publicize information about the various investment 
opportunities before the vouchers were exchanged for stock, ameliorating the 
asymmetric information problem, and then to help supervise the management 
of those firms whose stock they held.  The investment firms offered to buy 
vouchers at multiples of the nominal purchase price, so a good percentage of 
the citizens sold their vouchers to investment firms for a small but certain 
profit rather than participate in the exchange process.70  As a result, the 
investment firms came to dominate voucher privatization.71  With the largest 
and most successful investment firms owned by banks, the privatization 
 
 63. See generally Peter S. Green, Havel Steps Back into a Familiar Role: Czech Dissident, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2003, at A2 (referring to the “often corrupt post-Communist privatization”). 
 64. Yuliya Mitrofanskaya, Privatization As an International Phenomenon: Kazakhstan, 14 
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and Sequencing in Privatization: Theory and Evidence from the Czech Republic 5 (William 
Davidson Inst., Working Paper Series No. 323, 2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=294541; Nemat Shafik, Making a Market: 
Mass Privatization in the Czech and Slovak Republics 2–4 (World Bank: Policy Research, 
Working Paper No. 1231), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContent 
Server/WDSP/IB/1993/12/01/000009265_3961005150829/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf. 
 65. See Richard S. Gruner, Of Czechoslovakia and Ourselves: Essential Legal Supports for a 
Free Market Economy, 15 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 33, 35 & n.6 (1991). 
 66. Balfour & Crise, supra note 54, at 94–95. 
 67. Id.; Gruner, supra note 65, at 49; Mitrofanskaya, supra note 64, at 1409–10. 
 68. Mitrofanskaya, supra note 64, at 1410. 
 69. See id.; Baflour & Crise, supra note 54, at 94–95. 
 70. Mitrofanskaya, supra note 64, at 1410. 
 71. See id. 
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process resulted in a structure more like Germany and Japan (where banks 
influence management as a result of the high share of bank financing) rather 
than the United States.72  Although the vision of citizen/shareholder did not 
come to be, voucher privatization did successfully privatize many companies, 
as well as lead to the creation of the stock market.73 
III.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIVATIZATION AND DEMOCRACY 
For centuries, scholars have suggested that democracy advances economic 
growth.  As Douglass C. North has explained, “This positive view of the 
crucial role of democracy in both the perpetuation of liberty and the promotion 
of economic growth is the very foundation of liberal (in the classic meaning of 
the term) thought.”74  This belief in the benefits of democracy is related to the 
belief that certain social norms and religious values, generally prevalent in a 
democratic society, advance economic growth.75  Professor Rose puts the 
question the other way: does privatization advance democracy?76 Or, in a 
broader sense, does market-based economic growth advance democracy? 
To answer the question, we need to consider what constitutes a 
“democracy” and identify the relationships between privatization and the key 
elements of democracy.  We could say that a democracy entails governance by 
some type of representative majoritarian voting system with some protection 
for minority rights—but there is more to democracy than formal structures.  
Friedrich Hayek emphasized a dynamic process of opinion formation: 
Democracy is, above all, a process of forming opinion. . . . It is in its dynamic, 
rather than in its static, aspects that the value of democracy proves itself. . . . 
  The ideal of democracy rests on the belief that the view which will direct 
government emerges from an independent and spontaneous process.  It 
requires, therefore, the existence of a large sphere independent of majority 
control in which the opinions of the individuals are formed.77 
Robert Putnam explained his view of democracy as follows: 
Democratic theorists from John Stuart Mill to Robert Dahl have asserted that 
“the key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens.”  Democracy grants citizens the 
right to petition their government in the hope of achieving some individual or 
 
 72. See Peter Rutland, Privatization in East Europe: Another Case of Words That Succeed 
and Policies That Fail?, 5 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13 (1995). 
 73. Shafik, supra note 64, at 4 & n.4. 
 74. NORTH, supra note 3, at 56–57. 
 75. Id. at 57–58; see, e.g., MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF 
CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958). 
 76. See Rose, supra note 1, at 693–94. 
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at 56. 
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social goal, and it requires fair competition among different versions of the 
public interest.  Good government is, however, more than a forum for 
competing viewpoints or a sounding board for complaints; it actually gets 
things done.  A good democratic government not only considers the demands 
of its citizenry (that is, is responsive), but also acts efficaciously upon these 
demands (that is, is effective).78 
In his study of democracy, Putnam focused on the need for cooperation 
among citizens and examined how a society established and reinforced 
cooperative norms.79  Formal law both forces and teaches cooperation, of 
course, but the norms underlying cooperative behavior are at least as important 
as formal law.  To me, the question of how to achieve a successful democracy 
is part of the broader question of how groups overcome collective action 
problems or, to quote Putnam, how a society creates social capital “that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.”80  In 
economic terms, it is the same as asking how to minimize free riding; in game-
theoretic terms, it is asking how to induce people to cooperate rather than to 
defect.  The answer lies in the norms that induce this type of behavior.  The 
question then becomes: Does privatization or increased participation in an 
economic market advance cooperative norms? 
Participants in market exchange learn to cooperate with their trading 
partners.  Contrary to the Russian view of “cowboy capitalism” expressed in 
the early stages of the Russian transition, economic actors cannot routinely 
cheat, lie, and renege on contracts, at least not if they want to do business 
again.81  Repeat business depends on honesty, contract performance, and good 
reputation, which is cooperative behavior in the economic world.82  If 
cooperative norms can become ingrained by participating in economic activity 
and if those norms translate to social and political dealings, increased 
economic activity will advance democracy. 
Of the Czech privatization methods,83 small-scale privatization would have 
done the most to build cooperative norms by legitimizing a class of merchants 
and small business people whose world consisted of economic exchange and 
contract performance.84  Some of the privatizations made through restitution to 
merchants and small business people may have had the same effect.  A strong 
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middle class seems to be present in many democratic countries.  From this 
perspective, small-scale privatization and restitution helped the transition to 
democracy in the Czech Republic by strengthening the middle class.  
Assessing the political benefits of the ideal voucher privatization scheme is 
more difficult.  Trading stock, which is done impersonally, on an exchange, 
and frequently through a broker, is very different from a merchant’s buying 
and selling of goods and services.  I wonder if cooperative norms are learned 
by stock trading.  Perhaps if all the citizen/stock traders would have learned 
how to be economic actors, they would have learned cooperative economic 
norms in the process and possibly advanced democracy.  That seems unlikely 
to me, but the question is purely academic because the voucher program did 
not lead to a country of stockowners. 
The Czech large-scale privatization program was like most of the 
privatizations that have occurred worldwide: large state-owned enterprises are 
sold to large private firms.85  It is hard to see how cooperative norms or any 
aspect of democracy, for that matter, could be advanced by that kind of action.  
These were strictly business transactions between large business entities.  
Looking back at all the countries that have privatized large entities does not 
show changes in the democratic nature of their governments.  Mexico and 
Egypt were not functioning democracies when they made major divestitures,86 
nor were they afterwards.  There were no apparent changes in the democratic 
governance of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and Japan after 
their privatization waves.87  Spain and the Central European countries did 
become more democratic, but their privatizations came in the midst of great 
political reform in the transition from fascism for Spain and from communism 
for the Central European countries.88  Those political reforms were much more 
important than the privatizations in the transition to democracy.  In fact, it 
would be impossible to assess the influence the privatizations had on the 
movement toward democracy because they were dwarfed by the effects of the 
political reforms.89 
Another way to assess the effects that privatization and market 
liberalization have on democracy would be to observe the changes in China 
over the next decade or so.  China is going through a process of economic 
 
 85. See Mitrofanskaya, supra note 64, at 1409. 
 86. See text accompanying note 43. 
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reform while still trying to retain a party-controlled government.90  It may be 
that economic freedom will lead people to push for political freedoms, 
including greater participation in governance.  Even with the extent of 
economic liberalization over the past two decades, the Communist Party still 
maintains totalitarian control over much of society in China, something that 
will be hard to change.  Perhaps a form of democracy will emerge through 
competing groups within the Communist Party, rather than from the emergence 
of a new competing party.  Political reforms do not necessarily follow 
economic freedoms, however.  The experiences of Hungary and Poland under 
the communist regime illustrate that Hungary had a market economy in the 
small business and light industry sectors, and Poland never collectivized 
agriculture, but they both remained totalitarian communist countries.91 
Let me conclude by emphasizing that many people throughout the world 
care much more about physical and economic well-being than about political 
rights and democracy.  People who lack food and shelter do not give high 
priority to the right to vote in democratic elections; they care more about eating 
and having a roof over their heads.  To these people, privatization and market 
reforms are important just for their economic effects.  Once people achieve 
economic security, they can devote more energy to attaining political freedom.  
By relegating the protection of property rights to the constitutional dust bin, the 
United States Supreme Court was reflecting the economic well-being of the 
country.92  Those of us living in the United States and in the other developed 
countries of the world are lucky that we can think about the political 
consequences of privatization and not just worry about improving the 
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